(Note by John Pedler, former British diplomat, now a
consultant based in France: dipconsult@ hotmail.com. Author of ‘Our Broken
World’. The best round-up I have seen of the deeply flawed referendum campaign
is John Lanchester’s ‘Brexit Blues’ in the London Review of Books. His conclusions
are very similar to mine – I regret that he has not, so far, gone on to make a
case for the result to be considered invalid).
The requirement for a referendum if it is to reflect
the true will of the electorate
If a referendum is to reflect the reasonably well
informed will of the voters there must be easy access to the basic facts needed
to make a decision. This was not the case with the UK’s 23 June referendum, and
considering the controversy that had come to surround the subject, the UK’s EU
membership was not a suitable subject for a referendum. To make an informed
judgment in these circumstances one needed some knowledge of economics, foreign
affairs, and sociology.
Voters usually vote with some strongly held belief.
This generally works quite well when voting for a Member of Parliament who then
becomes responsible for taking decisions on behalf of his constituents as they
arise in the Commons where emotion is commonly balanced by reason. But
emotional elements – e.g. the protest element, the patriotic element – can
readily determine the outcome of a referendum without due regard to the
question asked.
I am concerned here to show prima facie that the 23
June referendum was so deeply flawed that it should not be accepted as the
considered will of those who voted – let alone of those who either could not,
or chose not to vote.
The history of the referendum on UK membership of the
EU
Because of the rapid rise of Nigel Farage’s UKIP (UK
Independence Party) demanding that the UK leave the EU, and increased
euroscepticism in the Conservative Party including among many of its MPs, its
leader David Cameron undertook in 2013 to hold a referendum on UK membership of
the EU before the end of 2017 if the Conservatives came to power in the 2015
elections. They did with a small overall majority. Cameron’s aim was thus to
overcome the damaging division among Conservatives over the EU with a ‘Yes’
vote.
When his gamble failed a considerable number of
Conservative MPs – both ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ begged Cameron to remain until the
autumn to allow a period of calm reflection before deciding on the way
ahead. He ignored this appeal and
resigned precipitately thereby likely doing more damage to the UK than he had
done even by the way he had conducted the referendum itself. For that enabled
Theresa May abruptly to succeed him as Prime Minister and, though ostensibly his
supporter for ‘Yes’, straightway declared that she is in fact a convinced
Brexiter and ‘Brexit means Brexit’. So it
is precisely those anti-EU Conservatives whom Cameron had planned to subdue,
who now govern the UK.
Possibly more than by anything else, Cameron’s defeat
can be explained by his decision to allow Ministers in his government freedom
to campaign for ‘No’ while yet remaining in office. That caused much confusion.
This was his referendum and it required his leadership and not contradiction
from within his own government. In addition he failed to prepare the electorate
for the referendum - instead, rather than choosing some date in 2017, he put it
forward to June 2016. Then, as the possibility of a ‘No’ majority increased,
apparently in desperation, he ran his own campaign ever less astutely.
Widespread Ignorance that this was an advisory
referendum
The most striking thing about the referendum - both in
the UK and abroad - is the almost universal acceptance that the comparatively
small majority of votes for 'No' means that the UK is now obliged to leave the
EU. The result was 48%-52%, a majority of 1.2m out of 33 1/2m votes
cast – certainly not a clear decision, rather proof of a country divided in
half which demanded of any government the most careful consideration of the
best interests of the UK before deciding on any action. Had all UK passport
holders resident outside the UK had the vote ‘yes’ would almost certainly have
won. And if just the 1.2m UK residents in the EU had the vote - those most
affected by the result - the ‘No’ majority would have been much diminished.
This result also ignores those in the UK who did not
vote, or even register – for example the young who feel estranged from today’s
political class, and Labour voters who could not bring themselves to vote for
‘Cameron’s’ Conservative referendum.
The young, the so-called millennials, who did vote voted
massively for ‘Remain’. They were aware that their future, more than that of
any other group, was at stake: European by birth they would have to live far
longer in the confines of ‘little England’ than the middle aged who voted ‘No’.
But so many of the under 25s did not trouble to register, feeling that they
have little in common with today’s political scene. It is worth mentioning them again further on.
Yet this was a purely Advisory
Referendum and the result is not in fact binding on any Prime
Minister or Government (although former Prime Minister Cameron did say
that he personally would accept the result). Even a great
many 'Yes' voters believe that they must swallow objections, no matter how
profound, because the 'British people have spoken' and so an extreme
interpretation of 'democracy' must be
allowed to prevail. Indeed, at the end of July, it seems almost taboo
to talk of avoiding Brexit for fear of provoking ‘Leave’ voters – although many
of these are known to be having second thoughts. And surely the UK’s national
interest should come before concerns about the reaction of some ‘Leave’ voters
– even if they number some in the present government.
The flaws in the referendum campaign
The campaign was dominated by misrepresentation
by 'Leave' and incompetence by 'Remain'.
This February I went to the UK to assess the situation
in the four month lead up to the referendum. Since then I have
done what I can to support the 'remain' campaign both
through personal contacts and organisations - notably Lord
Rose's 'Britain Stronger In Europe' and Alan Johnson MP’s 'Labour In for
Britain’.
During my enquiries in the UK, like so many others, I
soon came to the conclusion that the whole campaign was deeply flawed by that
misrepresentation and incompetence.
Misrepresentation by 'Leave'
Misrepresentation, even outright untruths, by the
leaders - Messrs. Boris Johnson MP, Michael Gove MP, and Nigel Farage leader of
UKIP, is well documented. Statistics about the cost of the EU to the UK were so
often incorrect that the Statistics Authority complained at their misuse. In
addition so much was suppressed. Here I only mention the claim that the UK pays
£8bn annually to the EU – without mentioning that in subsidies and other
payments it gets some £4bn back - and the famous Boris Johnson campaign bus
with its claim in huge letters ‘We send the EU £350m a week let’s fund our NHS
instead’ when in fact the figure is less than half that.
Boris Johnson declared more than once that the
referendum provided a ‘once in a lifetime … opportunity to take back control of
our country’ – an emotive phrase that ignored the fact that every treaty a
country signs involves some loss of sovereignty, some lack of that ‘control’.
Free trade agreements inevitably involve a marked loss of sovereignty – and so
would any arrangement the UK negotiated with the EU following Brexit. In a
word, no attempt was made by ‘Leave’ correctly to inform voters about what to
expect from Brexit. On the contrary, ‘Leave’ consistently played down the years
of uncertainty that would necessarily follow, giving voters the impression that
whatever they wanted from a ‘No’ vote would be realised, if not immediately,
then after only a short delay. Here are
just two typical remarks illustrating the confusion about the referendum: in
Peterborough a worker complained after voting
‘No’ – ‘When are those Pakis leaving ’ – failing to realise that only
immigration from the EU would be limited by Brexit, not the presence of those
from the Indian subcontinent whose immigration is under entirely UK control.
And in Bournemouth a middle aged accountant with a degree in the subject
remarked ‘why vote? They always come back until they get the answer they want’
(as in the case of the Irish referendums) not understanding the different
nature of this advisory referendum.
‘Leave’ – and notably Boris Johnson - campaigned on
the proposition that they knew better than the UK, EU and foreign politicians
and experts – including Barack Obama and the Canadian Governor of the Bank of England -
who strongly advised that UK remain in the EU.
But when ‘No’ prevailed, many were shocked to learn that none of the
‘Leave’ leaders had any plan for arriving at ‘Brexit’ – indeed Boris Johnson
found it politic to disappear from the scene. Their campaign had largely appealed to
populist sentiment, not to persuasion with facts. And such populism is
currently also threatening democracy in the US (Donald Trump), France (Marine
Le Pen), and in a number of other countries.
Another serious misrepresentation – so flagrant as to
be termed an outright lie by some observers – was ‘Leave’ leaders’ claim that
after Brexit the UK, being so important to the EU, would have access to the
Common Market without accepting free movement of EU citizens. This despite
clear warnings from EU leaders who fear the EU itself could unravel if the UK
left and got any such deal (some other countries might well want the same). Any
lingering hopes of such an outcome were dashed on 27 July when the President of
the Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, named the hardline EU operative Michel
Barnier as the EU’s chief negotiator for Brexit.
The media's bias towards 'Leave'
Much of the media – struggling against
competition from the internet - gave ‘Leave’s most dubious statements headline coverage
in search of circulation at the expense of
accuracy. Notably, the Daily Telegraph favoured Brexit, continuing to
feature their lead correspondent, Boris Johnson, elaborating on his habitual
contempt for the EU, where he had first made his name as the Telegraph’s
correspondent in Brussels. Rupert Murdoch,
the American, former Australian, the world’s leading purveyor of news, also
favoured Brexit. His ‘The Sun’ the UK’s highest circulation tabloid (1.8
million) did at least as much damage to 'Remain': two examples - Murdoch
associate Michael Gove was involved in getting The Sun's front page 'The
Queen Backs Brexit' headline plus full page photo. Although
the piece was found 'substantially misleading', the damage to 'Remain'
must have been considerable given the all but universal popularity of
the Queen. Many in the rest of the media made much of it.
On 22 June readers woke up to The Sun's headline
'BeLEAVE in Britain'. This after hearing Boris Johnson's dramatic appeal the
night before 'Make the 23rd of June Britain's Independence Day’ -
the closing words of the BBC’s ‘Great Debate’ which in fact was not a debate
which would have given an opportunity for Yes’ to set out its basic case.
It was in fact a major two hour questions programme which favoured ‘Leave’ with
its penchant for short slogans. So even the well-trusted and supposedly
impartial BBC finally came down for 'No'.
Even more importantly, Boris Johnson, more of a
self-publicising journalist than a politician, became the TV
personality of the campaign, generally without corrective reporting.
Without any need for bias by TV stations, through constant exposure Boris
Johnson became the TV star throughout - the referendum celebrity when it is celebrities
who are revered, not politicians. Johnson made light of the problems that
Britain would face if it were to leave the EU and of the long period of delay
and uncertainty that would necessarily follow. Indeed, when 'No' got
a majority, Boris Johnson had no plan for 'Brexit' and faded into
obscurity until appointed Foreign Secretary by Theresa May, Cameron's successor
who had been for 'In', but overnight became a Prime Minister doggedly
resolved to lead the UK to Brexit. The German Foreign Minister spoke for many
when he described Johnson’s appointment as 'Ungeheurlich' -
outrageous.
Exposure on TV not only ensures that you are known,
but that your message, however extreme, is unforgettable. Frequent appearance
on TV does much to magnify the spread of populism in the US (Donald Trump),
France (Marine Le Pen) and the UK (Boris Johnson) where extreme statements
which resonate with certain elements of the population are believed with little
question.
Incompetence of ‘Remain’
Misrepresentation by ‘Leave’ and the bias of much of
the media made it difficult enough to find factual information about the key
issues raised by the referendum. But this was compounded by the
incompetence of ‘Remain’. Both Lord Stuart Rose's 'Britain Stronger
In Europe' and Alan Johnson's 'Labour In for Britain' failed lamentably in
getting across their essential message to the general public and to former
Labour voters in particular. When ‘Britain Stronger In’ was founded on 12
October 2015, much of the media predicted failure. Lord Rose, a businessman,
lacked the needed political savvy and was prone to making unfortunate remarks -
even forgetting the name of the organisation of which he was Chair. He kept a
low profile and in any case was very far from the charismatic TV personality
needed to oppose Boris Johnson that ‘Stronger In’ so urgently needed. Indeed
the failure to find one was a major reason for the failure of ‘Stronger In’. It
is surprising that such a second rate organisation became the ‘official’
spokesman for ‘Yes’ on 13 April 2016. If the body politic had bothered, the UK
could have set up a far more effective body for such an extremely important
purpose.
i) ‘Britain
Stronger In Europe’
‘Stronger In’ concentrated, efficiently enough, on the
economic advantages of staying in the EU but ignored the fact that referendum
voters are less interested in dry facts than their need to feel a strong emotional
incentive for their decision - something that touches them personally. ‘Leave’
though, skillfully sounded a chord with its emphasis on immigration and
patriotism – two key issues ‘Stronger In’ largely ignored even though this was
expressly drawn to its attention. But even if it had been more responsive and
had heeded advice, it lacked the means and publicity savoir faire to put this
across to the public – something all but impossible without that TV
personality.
ii) ‘Labour
In For Britain’
When, in October 2015, I was first in touch with Alan
Johnson – the MP charged with Labour’s campaign for a ‘Yes’ vote through
‘Labour In For Britain’ - he appeared to be well informed of the problems and
likely to conduct an effective campaign. But in the event his ‘Labour In For
Britain’ was even more of a disappointment than ‘Stronger In’. Its website was
the same day after day and there was no contact given so I was unable to get
the text of Jeremy Corbyn’s speech of 14 May, one of, if not the, best speeches
for ‘yes’. (I got my copy through the party’s regular website ‘Labour List’).
Indeed this exceptional speech was almost entirely
overlooked by the media which had long been disparaging Corbyn whatever he
said. Almost alone, the speech made much
of the important role Britain had in the reform of the EU, desired by so many
of both its countries and peoples, to make the EU more responsive to its
peoples and less of a club for capitalists. That countered a key ‘Leave’
assertion that the EU is incapable or reform.
Corbyn, one of the few who looked beyond Britain to
the wider world, pointed out that it was the EU that guaranteed many of the
human and other rights of workers. He put
Climate Change deservedly first in his list of challenges which the EU
countries – with Britain - could only resolve together. As he put it – ‘It is
not the EU that is the problem but a Conservative Government ….’ This speech deserves reading today as an
example of how the media – and Labour itself – ignored the truly important
issues for voters.
The Labour Party shares a heavy responsibility for the
incompetence of ‘Remain’ which left ‘Leave’ to be positive and strike the note
of hope so important in attracting voters. Indeed, examining the results
throughout the UK, Labour may well have lost the referendum. It utterly failed
to persuade its traditional supporters that – as its Leader Jeremy Corbyn had
stressed so persuasively – a ‘yes’ vote was greatly in their interest. ‘Yes’
would be a Labour win – not just a Cameron Conservative win, while a ‘No’ would
be a licence for the most diehard Tories to run the country at the expense of
the working man and of the UK itself.
But Labour did not recover in time from the unexpected
collapse of its vote in the 2015 election. Despite the election of Jeremy
Corbyn as its left wing Leader, Labour had not learned the lesson of its
failure to meet the aspirations, concerns, and bitterness of its traditional
voters mainly from the white working class. Tony Blair’s New Labour under David
Milliband was too much of a left-of-centre form of the Conservative party to be
capable of exploiting the disillusion and anger caused by those dire effects of
globalization on traditional ways of life. One of the most painful of these
being so called ‘zero hour contracts’ removing security of employment from as
many as 1m British workers and affecting many more. This too, had little to do
with the EU, rather it reflected the misdirected austerity policies of David
Cameron’s government. In the absence the traditional loyalty to Labour, this
exasperation expressed itself in a massive protest vote against EU membership.
This protest vote was also fuelled by immigration –
whole towns had become socially unrecognisable not only as a result of
immigration mainly from the Indian sub-continent (under UK government control)
but also because of immigrants from the EU – notably from its poorer countries
(due to the EU requirement for free movement of its citizens over which
individual countries had no control). These two were frequently confused.
On this immensely important issue, not only Labour and
‘Stronger In’ but Cameron himself suffered a major setback defeat when the
latest figure for 330,000 net arrivals from the EU was published shortly before
the vote. This setback was unnecessary. It resulted from the incompetence not
only of ‘Remain’ but of Cameron himself – for the figure included 169,000
students so only 161,000 could be classed as immigrants (barely above the
140,000 considered not only acceptable but desirable). The misleading 330,000 figure did Cameron and
the case for ‘Remain’ great harm because immigration had by then become the
leading issue for so many voters.
iii) Patriotism
- this deserves separate mention for to some extent it influences all voters. I
have already mentioned the damage done to ‘Remain’ by The Sun’s front page
headline ‘The Queen backs Brexit’ with its misleading message for patriots.
Appealing to patriotism was a staple ploy for ‘Leave’,
but surprisingly barely featured in ‘Remain’ publicity. Here again ‘Stronger
In’ ignored advice to challenge ‘Leave’ on this emotional issue.
‘Leave’ painted a picture of a Britain of the past,
all but entirely white, and with the worldwide respect due to a country, once
the possessor of the world’s greatest empire, and the ‘winner’ of both World
Wars. The image was of everyone standing together as Britain stood alone during
its Finest Hour.
‘Remain’ failed to use TV to put across the
up-to-date, forward looking, alternative which had been suggested and is worth
sketching here. It told of how England and later Britain, for more than four
centuries had fought wars at great expense in blood and treasure to prevent any
power dominating Europe - from Spain’s Philip II, France’s Louis XIV and
Napoleon, to Germany’s Kaiser and Hitler. And after that Britain had played a major role in countering
the pretensions of the Soviet Union. Throughout this history Britain had
prevailed thanks to allies - so it was with European allies that Britain had at
last done so much to establish the period of peace after World War II that made
possible the great experiment of a European Union of all its peoples and
dominated by none.
Did voters really want the UK now to turn its back on
friends and partners leaving them in the lurch at a time of crisis when UK support
was sorely needed? And did ‘Leave’ voters really want to leave to a reluctant
Germany the leadership of the EU?
This appeal to patriotism would have appealed to many,
and in particular to the elderly who, in the event, voted massively for
‘Leave’.
Labour too, failed to publicise the rather different
patriotism implied in Corbyn’s 14 May speech – the solidarity of all workers
‘by hand or brain’. Here the emphasis
was on the great role for Britain in leading the much desired reform of the EU
– as I have said, to make the Union more in the interest of its peoples, and
less of a purely economic vehicle for business and finance. And, as importantly, here was the opportunity
with its partners in the EU for Britain to take a lead in facing up to the
great challenges of Climate Change, emigration, Russia, and the prevention of
terrorism - all beyond the UK’s powers to deal with alone.
One observer aptly noted: ‘If the UK puts as much effort into reforming
the EU as it would have to in order to make a success of Brexit, the UK and the
EU would both be better off’.
Neglect of the ‘millenials’
Just as Labour failed so dismally to understand the
extent of the grievances of its usual supporters, so all those working for
‘Yes’ equally failed to gain the votes of the ‘millenials’ already mentioned.
There was no imagination, no enthusiasm to reach out to the idealism of the
under 25s – involving their celebrities, using their music, and addressing
their feelings of disinterest and isolation from the humdrum materialism of the
world of the over 30s around them. Yet
such an approach would have got many more to register and many more actually to
vote in order to preserve their influence and ensure their participation in
making the Europe of the future and its clout in the world. Votes enough at
least further to dent that million and quarter majority for ‘Leave’.
Threat to the UK as at present constituted
Scotland voted to remain, so did Northern Ireland.
This raises complex questions about a) the ability of Scotland to leave the UK
in order to remain in the EU, or to remain in the UK but retain membership of
the EU, and b) the legislation that would be needed to avoid the return of the
border between Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic – a border that would in
fact become a frontier between the UK and the EU. It appears that all parties in the North,
whatever their other differences, are anxious to avoid that.
Leave played down the threat to the UK’s integrity and
‘Remain’, typically did not explain just how difficult these issues would be to
resolve in the event of a ‘No’ vote, nor the possibility that, after ‘No’,
Scotland might actually leave the Union despite the result of the 2014
referendum.
If ‘Remain’ had
made more of these issues, quite a few votes could have been different.
Few voting in a referendum – or even in an election –
are much swayed by foreign policy. There was quite a bit said about the
diminution of Britain’s influence in the world if alone rather than acting
through the EU. Just one example that was hardly mentioned was Hong Kong,
perpetually under pressure from the government in Peking. Here the UK, acting
discreetly with the EU, has had significant influence in helping preserve Hong
Kong’s quasi-independent status. Without the importance the EU has for Peking,
the intervention of Britain alone could more easily be dismissed as
unacceptable from the previous colonial power.
A final word
I conclude this note by drawing attention to way the
world goes on as usual after the shock of the British referendum. The international
media has moved on to other news simply accepting that the UK will now be too
busy with the highly complex and long term self-inflicted problem of leaving
the EU to be able to play the part it should in the world. There are observers
in the UK, in the EU, and in the world who still ask how Brexiters and their
new Prime Minister, against the advice of the UK’s friends and allies and with
that mere 52% v. 48%, majority, can possibly go for Brexit with such
self-assurance and determination when, even with all possible optimism, any
possible advantages of leaving the UK would be negligible compared with those
of ‘remaining’.
Here in France, where British common sense has long
been cited with some envy, observers find it hard to believe that the least
informed are tugging the better informed into an unknown and dubious future
letting the distraction of Brexit prevent the UK from dealing with the world’s
great problems with its allies as its importance requires.
I much hope that this offering, and no doubt others
similar, will help towards making the case that only Parliament can take the
decision to trigger Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty. Surely no one person, let
alone such a single-minded and determined a Brexiter as Prime Minister May, can
be left to take Britain out of the European Union on the basis of a referendum
so deeply flawed as even this short note has shown? I hope that those far
better qualified than I, will put together the readily available information
and present properly drawn up evidence of the unacceptability of the referendum
result both for the Courts this October, and for the public. (Article 50 attached)
[This may be forwarded to any who may be interested. I
would be grateful for comments and for any errors to be drawn to my attention
at dipconsult@ hotmail.com]
Article 50
1. Any Member State may decide to withdraw from the
Union in accordance with its own constitutional requirements.
2. A Member State which decides to withdraw shall
notify the European Council of its intention. In the light of the guidelines
provided by the European Council, the Union shall negotiate and conclude an
agreement with that State, setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal,
taking account of the framework for its future relationship with the Union.
That agreement shall be negotiated in accordance with Article 218(3) of the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. It shall be concluded on
behalf of the Union by the Council, acting by a qualified majority, after
obtaining the consent of the European Parliament.
3. The Treaties shall cease to apply to the State in
question from the date of entry into force of the withdrawal agreement or,
failing that, two years after the notification referred to in paragraph 2,
unless the European Council, in agreement with the Member State concerned,
unanimously decides to extend this period.
4. For the purposes of paragraphs 2 and 3, the member
of the European Council or of the Council representing the withdrawing Member
State shall not participate in the discussions of the European Council or
Council or in decisions concerning it.
A qualified majority shall be defined in accordance
with Article 238(3)(b) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
5. If a State which has withdrawn from the Union asks
to rejoin, its request shall be subject to the procedure referred to in Article
49.
--------------------------
UCL Constitution Unit note:
The first point to note about
Article 50 is that it is a once-and-for-all decision; there is
no turning back once Article 50
has been invoked. If no acceptable withdrawal
agreement has been reached after
two years, the exiting Member State is left without
any deal with the EU. It is of
course possible to extend the time period. But this is in
the gift of the EU Council and
requires its unanimous agreement.
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